Kiipu

謹作高山刀　Kinsaku Takayama-tō. 刀匠 Tōshō　正直 Ishihara Masanao. 研師 Togishi　吉左衛門 Kichizaemon. @SteveM

Need more information to make a determination. The link below shows the ito wrap used on some of the Indonesian made swords. Hope this helps. Identification help

Can you post some pictures of the scabbard without the protective cover? Also a picture of the scabbard throat would help as well.

That kind of ito wrap was used on some of the occupation swords from Indonesia.

大.一〇 = 1921. Tōkyō Artillery Arsenal logo. Inspection mark.

That is serial number 15383 that can be seen via the link below. Imperial Japanese Army Tokyo Arsenal Type 25 Cavalry Sword

Sign behind Guy, Post #13 @Stegel

Monthly BTT

BTT

United States. National Archives. Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Siam, 1910–1929. Microfilm Publication M729. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1968. Microfilm roll 10. This roll covers the military and naval affairs of Siam, for details about the roll see below. US$60. Roll 10 Military and Naval Affairs 892.20–892.156/9 Army, army reports, fortifications; visit of U. S. Brigadier General William Mitchel to military establishments in Siam, 1924; army maneuvers in Siam; new decree relating to military service, 1913; volunteer scouts organized, 1911; equipment and supplies; army airplanes, dirigibles, observation balloons; naval affairs, the navy, naval vessels; maneuvers of the Royal Siamese Navy, 1923; naval equipment and supplies. m0729-rg059-r10-index.pdf

United States. National Archives and Records Administration. National Archives. United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific): Reports and Other Records, 1928–47. National Archives Microfilm Publications, M1655. Washington, D.C.: NARA, 1991. Microfilm. Rolls 252, 252A, 253, 253A, 253B, 253C, 253D, 253E, 254, 254A, 254B, 255, 255A. Contains the “Military Supply Division” published reports along with the background and supporting data used in the reports. See attached index for list of published reports and supporting documents. 43: Japanese War Production Industries. 44: Japanese Naval Ordnance. 45: Japanese Army Ordnance. 46: Japanese Naval Shipbuilding. 47: Japanese Motor Vehicle Industry. 48: Japanese Merchant Shipbuilding. m1655-roll-252-255a-index.pdf

United States. National Archives and Records Administration. National Archives. United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific): Intelligence Library, 1932–1947. National Archives Microfilm Publications, M1652. Washington, D.C.: NARA, 1991. Microfilm. Rolls 42, 43, 44, 45, 54, 57, 77. The Intelligence Library consists of publications and reports used by the Survey for reference purposes. See the attached indexes for the list of documents for each roll. Price per roll is US$60 including shipping within United States. m1652-roll-042-045-index.pdf m1652-roll-054-index.pdf m1652-roll-057-index.pdf m1652-roll-077-index.pdf

United States. United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Index to Records of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. June 1947. Microfilm, 317 pages. This was originally published as a book and later it was microfilmed by NARA. The USSBS collected an enormous amount of primary English and Japanese language documents, most of which are held at the United States National Archives and Record Administration’s (NARA) Archives II complex in College Park, Maryland. The above index is a crucial finding aid for accessing these primary source materials detailing the effects of Allied bombing on Germany and Japan. US$30 including shipping to US.

Trystan did a little writeup on these some time back. The blades were made in the Soviet Union and the rest in PRC. @BANGBANGSAN

United States. United States Naval Technical Mission to Japan. Ships and Related Targets: Japanese Submarine Operations. Index No. S-17. 04 February 1946. 35mm Microfilm. Paid the Library of Congress to microfilm S-17 back in the late 1980s or early 1990s. US$30. The summary for report S-17 is below. Hampered by shortages of all kinds, assigned to a minor role with its forces dispersed in a losing war against a well-equipped enemy, the Japanese submarine force should be given credit for effort. However, in addition to its handicaps, there were several shortcomings of its own which prevented a creditable performance. Among these shortcomings of its own which prevented a creditable performance. Among these shortcomings were vacillating policies in building, false economy in withholding submarines for future use, failure to correct known mistakes, confusion of tactical command, poor communications, and a lack of individual caliber in many of the commanding officers. Briefly, in no particular could it be said that the Japanese submarine force excelled, while examples are many of its deficiency in strategical, tactical, research and personnel performance.